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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
DERRICK WADE GARDNER, : Case No. 20090782-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a conviction for one count of possession with intent to 
distribute a controlled/counterfeit substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (2007); and one count of use or possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) 
(2007), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, 
Judgment, Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Gardner's motion to suppress 
the evidence because the deputy's Terry frisk of him violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress presents a 
mixed question of law and fact. This Court reviews the trial court's factual findings for 
clear error and its legal conclusions, without deference, for correctness. See State v. 
Morris, 2009 UT App 181, %5, 214 P.3d 883. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 186; 187:120-21. 
Issue II: Did the trial court err in allowing the deputies to testify, based on their 
training and experience, regarding evidence that is indicative of an intention to distribute 
a controlled substance without qualifying them as experts and without giving notice to 
defense. 
Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49,1J9. 147 P.3d 1176. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following provisions determinative of the issues on appeal are 
located in Addendum B: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) 
(2007); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (2008); Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2008); Utah R. Evid. 701; Utah R. Evid. 702; Utah R. Civ. P. 26 
(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 1, 2008, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Gardner with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in 
2 
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violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (2007), and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) 
(2007). R. 1-2. On October 30, 2008, Mr. Gardner filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence during an unlawful and warrantless search. R. 23-30. 
On November 20, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion to 
suppress. R. 42-43; 186. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law 
denying Mr. Gardner's motion to suppress. R. 49-51; 186:31-32. A copy of the findings 
and conclusions is attached as Addendum C. 
On July 7, 2009, a jury trial was held. Before the jury was brought in, Mr. 
Gardner made a motion in limine to prevent the deputies in this case from making 
references that the quantity of drugs together with other evidence recovered was 
indicative of an intent to distribute. R. 187:12-14. Mr. Gardner argued that such 
testimony was inadmissible from the deputies as lay witnesses. R. 187:12-14. Mr. 
Gardner argued that to present such testimony required an expert and the State had failed 
to give notice that it intended to call these deputies as experts. R. 187:12-14. The trial 
court denied the motion in limine. R. 187:13-14. 
During trial, Mr. Gardner made numerous objections to the deputies testifying that 
the evidence recovered was indicative of distribution. R. 187:75, 76, 81, 101, 131-32, 
133, 139, 140. When the trial court again overruled Mr. Gardner's objection to a 
deputy's testimony that the amount of methamphetamine found on Mr. Gardner ulook[ed] 
3 
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like something you'd break down later into smaller packaging," Mr. Gardner moved for a 
mistrial. R. 187:138-40. The trial court instructed the State to continue. R. 187:140. 
After the deputies completed their testimony and the jury was excused, the trial 
court addressed the motion for mistrial, denying it. R, 187:160-164,172-175. Mr. 
Gardner renewed his motion for mistrial arguing that because the jury had already heard 
the evidence, the prejudice could not be cured with an instruction. R. 187:175. The trial 
court denied the motion again stating "you should have objected—just objected to it 
before the answer came. When you heard the question." R. 187:175. At the end of the 
State's case, Mr. Gardner reserved his right to move for a directed verdict. R. 187:178. 
The trial court denied the motion for directed verdict. R. 187:198. 
The jury convicted Mr. Gardner of both charged offenses. R. 153; 187:199. On 
August 24, 2009, Mr. Gardner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years at the Utah State Prison, suspended, and 180 day on the class B misdemeanor with 
credit for time served. R. 169-71. Mr. Gardner was ordered to serve 180 days in jail and 
placed on probation for 36 months. R. 169-71. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 23, 2008, Deputy Blake Day observed a vehicle fail to properly signal 
and also had a cracked windshield obstructing the driver's view and initiated a traffic 
stop. R. 186:5; 187:63. Joseph Neubauer was the driver of the vehicle and Mr. Gardner 
was a passenger in the front seat. R. 187:65-66, 117. During the stop, Day maintained 
4 
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continued visual contact of both the driver and passenger and did not observe any type of 
furtive movement. R. 187:65,85-86,99. After running the driver's license, Day 
discovered that Mr. Neubauer had several outstanding warrants for his arrest and a hazard 
alert warning he carried concealed weapons, was mentally unstable and a drug user. R. 
186:5;187:67, 87. Based on this information, Day decided to arrest the driver. R. 186:5; 
187:67. Prior to arresting the driver, Day called for backup to assist. R. 186:5; 187:67. 
While waiting for backup to arrive, Day continued visual contact of the driver and 
passenger and did not see any furtive movements. R. 187:67. 
Three additional deputies responded to Day's backup request. R. 187:77, 98, 116, 
135, 149, 152. K-9 Deputy Kevin Barrett, was the first to arrive on scene followed by 
Deputy Angie Hunter and K-9 Deputy Jeffrey Leslie. R. 187:77, 98, 135, 152. Once 
Barrett arrived, Day informed him of what was going on. R. 186:12; 187:69, 140. As 
Day approached the driver, Barrett positioned himself on the passenger side of the 
vehicle to watch both the driver and Mr. Gardner. R. 187:116. Barrett testified that Mr. 
Gardner was nervous and he was "fidgeting quite a bit with his hands" which were 
"between his legs and his lap" and "shuffling his hands underneath his legs and then 
bringing them out and making a lot of movements." R. 186:12; 187:142. Day asked 
Neubauer if there were any weapons in the vehicle. R. 186:6, 8; 187:68, 88. Neubauer 
was cooperative and "volunteered] that there was either a knife or knives in the vehicle. 
R. 186:6, 8-9; 187:68, 87-88, 117. At this point, Day asked Neubauer to exit the vehicle 
5 
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and took him into custody and then gave custody of him over to Hunter. R. 187:69, 89, 
117,141. 
As Neubauer was being arrested, Barrett testified to overhearing Day ask 
Neubauer "where is the knife." R. 187:117. Barrett testified that "picked [his] attention 
up" because part of his job involves safety "and to hear that there was a knife somewhere 
in the whereabouts of this car alerted me." R. 187:117. Barrett thought that Mr. Gardner 
might have the knife given "Mr. Gardner's nervousness and the fact that the driver, 
[Neubauer], had a weapons history and now we've got an unknown knife in an unknown 
location." R. 186:14, 17. To "assess his reactions and also get responses" from Mr. 
Gardner, Barrett began talking to him. R. 187:118. Barrett explained to Mr. Gardner that 
because Neubauer was being arrested the vehicle would be impounded. R. 186:13; 
187:118, 141. Barrett testified that upon learning this, Mr. Gardner became more 
nervous and fidgety "which [was] a danger sign for [him]." R. 186:13-14; 187:118, 141-
42. However, Barrett did not think that either occupant was "being disruptive or 
aggressive or threatening in any manner." R. 186:19. Barrett asked Mr. Gardner if he 
had any property inside the vehicle. R. 187:118-19. Mr. Gardner stated that he did not 
have any property inside the vehicle. R. 187:119. Barrett then asked Mr. Gardner to exit 
the vehicle, "as the vehicle would have to be impounded." R. 187:119. 
When Mr. Gardner exited the vehicle, Barrett asked "if he had any weapons or 
knives on him." R. 186:14, 18. Day "covered" Barrett while Mr. Gardner was exiting 
6 
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the vehicle. R. 187:70. Mr. Gardner responded that he did not have any weapons on 
him. R. 186:14. Barrett then asked Mr. Gardner if he could give "him a Terry frisk." R. 
186:14; 187:70, 119. Mr. Gardner "raised his arms up and turned around" but did not 
answer. R. 186:14, 20-21; 187:71. Barrett could not remember whether Mr. Gardner 
raised his arms to a 45 degree angle as he had testified in the preliminary hearing or 
whether his arms were at a 90 degree angle. R. 186:20. Barrett assumed Mr. Gardner 
was consenting to being frisked and began to pat him down. R. 186:15. 
While patting down Mr. Gardner's right pant leg Barrett felt a "hard object with a 
small ball at the end and a smaller cylindrical tube rising up from it." R. 186:15-16, 
187:120-21. Barrett believed this could possibly be a drug pipe. R. 186:16; 187:121. 
Mr. Gardner was wearing carpenter type pants and Barrett testified that he could see 
down into the pocket and saw the top of a glass pipe with white residue inside of it which 
he recognized as a drug pipe. R. 186:16; 187:71, 121, 142. Barrett asked Mr. Gardner 
what was inside the pipe and Gardner said it was methamphetamine. R. 186:16; 187:121-
22, 142. Mr. Gardner was placed under arrest. R. 186:16; 187:121-22, 142. Day 
testified that he did not speak to Mr. Gardner until after he was in custody. R. 187:89. 
Day testified that at that point, Mr. Gardner appeared nervous because his hands and 
voice were shaking and he looked scared but Mr. Gardner was never uncooperative or 
threatening. R. 186:8, 10; 187:88. 
7 
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A subsequent search of Mr. Gardner's person revealed two small green Ziploc 
bags, about one inch-by-one inch, containing methamphetamine; a "sandwich bag" 
containing three empty small green bags, one inch-by-one inch; a clear cellophane 
wrapper containing ten tablets marked Seroquel 200, a prescription narcotic; a clear 
plastic bag containing white crystals, $666 in cash; a sandwich bag containing papers 
with names, banking and account information; gift cards; a cellular phone battery; an 
iPod; and miscellaneous papers. R. 187:71-72, 96-97, 122-131, 133, 139, 143. Some of 
the names listed were those of life insurance and construction companies. R. 187:97, 
133. Over Mr. Gardner's numerous objections, the trial court allowed Day and Barrett to 
testify that based on their training and experience these items recovered from Mr. 
Gardner were indicative of drug distribution. R. 187:75-77,80-81, 101, 138-140. 
The jury found Mr. Gardner guilty of both count 1, possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute and count 2, use or possession of drug paraphernalia. 
R. 168; 187:199. This appeal followed. R. 177. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should reverse because the trial court erred by denying Mr. Gardner's 
motion to suppress. The totality of the circumstances show that the frisk was not justified 
by reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner, a passenger, was armed and presently 
dangerous. Absent Mr. Gardner's increased nervousness upon learning the driver was 
being arrested and the vehicle impounded, the only other factors relied on by Barrett to 
8 
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justify the frisk was the driver's hazard alert, information volunteered by the driver that 
there may be a knife or knives located inside the vehicle and the inability of Day to locate 
a knife at that moment. Barrett had continuously monitored Mr. Gardner's movements 
while inside the vehicle, Mr. Gardner complied with all of the deputy's orders and 
nothing in Mr. Gardner's demeanor made Barrett fear for his safety. Even if the 
circumstances of the stop created a reasonable suspicion, Barrett mitigated the danger by 
ordering Mr. Gardner out of the vehicle while Day was covering him. Once Mr. Gardner 
had exited the vehicle, it dispelled any reasonable suspicion of danger. 
The frisk was also not supported by a valid consent thereby violating the Fourth 
Amendment. The trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Gardner gave sufficient 
indication of consent when he raised both of his arms and turned around when asked by 
Barrett if he could frisk him. The totality of circumstances show that Mr. Gardner was 
merely acquiescing to the show of police authority rather than specifically and » 
unequivocally consenting to Barrett's request to frisk him. Because the purpose of the 
stop had been effectuated, by the arrest and impounding of the driver and his vehicle, Mr. 
Gardner's continued detention violated the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, even if this 
Court were to determine Mr. Gardner's consent was voluntary, it was obtained by the 
deputy's exploitation of the unlawful detention. 
The testimony by the deputies regarding the amount of methamphetamine, money, 
"tally sheet," and other evidence recovered from Mr. Gardner was indicative of an intent 
9 
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to distribute is based on specialized knowledge, admissible only as expert testimony. The 
trial court abused its discretion in ruling the specialized testimony given by these deputies 
was not expert testimony requiring the State to qualify and give advanced notice under 
Utah law. Where the State relied on the witnesses' specialized knowledge to prove an 
element of the offense, it cannot be said that the testimony did not influence the jury's 
verdict, therefore, a new trial is required. A new trial is also required where the trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to grant a motion for mistrial where the specialized 
testimony likely influenced the jury so much so that it cannot be said that Mr. Gardner 
had a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY RULING THE FRISK DID NOT VIOLATE THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the 'right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting U.S. 
Const, amend. IV). '"[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id (quoting Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)); State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115,110 (same)). 
"[A] search 'is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should not 
be taken lightly.'" State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1J13, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Terry v. 
10 
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Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,17 (1968)). Accordingly, an officer "may perform a protective frisk" 
only when he has "a valid reason for stopping the person" and he "reasonably believes 
[the] person is 'armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others.'" Warren, 2003 
UT 36 at 1J13 (citations omitted); see State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, [^26, 103 P.3d 699 
(holding "a search will be valid only if the officer reasonably believes both that the 
suspect is dangerous, and that he may obtain immediate control of weapons" (citations 
omitted)); Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ]fl3 ("The sole purpose for allowing the frisk is to 
protect the officer and other prospective victims by neutralizing potential weapons" 
(citations omitted)); State v. Parke, 2009 UT App 50, f6, 205 P.3d 104 (same); cf Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-16 (2008) ("A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or 
any other person is in danger."); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) (holding 
section 77-7-16 must be interpreted to meet "constitutional requirements of Terry"). 
The reasonableness of a frisk is "evaluated objectively according to the totality of 
the circumstances." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ffl[14, 25 (citation omitted); Parke, 2009 UT 
App 50, Tf7. "To determine reasonableness, a court should question whether 'the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.'" Warren, 2003 
UT 36, ^ fl4 (citation omitted). Although, "the officer's subjective belief may be a factor 
in the objective analysis," it "is not enough alone to justify a protective frisk." Id at fflj 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15-16, 20-21. Rather, "the officer must be able to point to specific facts which, 
considered with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." 
Id at If 14 (citation omitted). In other words, when "determining reasonableness, 'due 
weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
"hunch," but to specific reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience.'" Id (citation omitted) (alterations in original). "'If a 
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is 
no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.'" Id at ]f 13 (citations 
omitted) 
Absent reasonable suspicion an officer can only conduct a Terry frisk if it is 
conducted pursuant to valid consent. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f47, 63 P.3d 
650. When the State "seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, [it] 
has the burden of proving that the consent was in fact, freely and voluntarily given." 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). The State cannot discharge its 
burden "by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Id. at 
548-49. 
In this case, the totality of the circumstances show that the frisk was not justified 
by reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner was armed and presently dangerous. See infra 
Part A. Nor does the evidence support that Mr. Gardner voluntarily consented to a Terry 
frisk. .See infra Part B. Therefore, this Court should suppress all of the evidence 
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discovered in this case because its discovery was a direct result of the illegal frisk. See 
infra at Part C. 
A. The Frisk Violated the Fourth Amendment Because It Was Unreasonable 
Under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
An "inherent dangerousness" exists in all "traffic stops." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 
|22. But this does not mean that a frisk is justified in every traffic stop. See id In fact, a 
frisk is not justified in most traffic stops because the "danger can be fully or partially 
mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the vehicle." Id In a few cases, "the nature 
of the crime being investigated is sufficient to trigger the officer's reasonable suspicion, 
such as a murder or robbery." Brake, 2004 UT 95 at p 2 ; Terry, 392 U.S. at 28 (holding 
frisk permissible where officer suspected defendant was involved in "daylight robbery— 
which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons"). 
"[F]or other types of crimes," however, "such as trafficking in small quantities of 
narcotics, possession of marijuana,. . . underage drinking, driving under the influence, 
and lesser traffic offenses, minor assault without weapons, or vagrancy, there must be 
particular facts which lead the officer to believe that a suspect is armed." Brake, 2004 
UT 95 at TJ32 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Hence, when investigating a minor traffic offense, the officer may not claim the 
"inherent dangerousness of all traffic stops" as justification for a frisk. Warren, 2003 UT 
36 at Tf22. Instead, justification for the frisk requires the officer to "observe" the suspect 
and to identify particular facts that lead him to believe the suspect is armed and presently 
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dangerous. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U.S. 85, 94, (1979) ("The 'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a 
frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be 
frisked."). In this case, the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner was 
armed and presently dangerous. 
The trial court made the following findings of fact in holding the Terry frisk was 
justified: (1) On March 23rd, Officers initiated a traffic stop involving the defendant; (2) 
The driver of the vehicle had a history of drugs and dangerous weapons; (3) The driver 
admitted that there was/were knive(s) in the car; (4) The defendant acted with heightened 
nervousness upon being asked to exit the vehicle and (5) At that time the knife had not 
yet been located. R. 49-50; 186:31-32. The trial court concluded that the deputy's 
"[kjnowledge of the driver's history with weapons, the driver's admission that there was 
a knife in the vehicle and the defendant's nervousness justified the Terry frisk." R. 50; 
186:31-32. The trial court's determination was incorrect because Mr. Gardner's 
nervousness along with information that the driver had a history with weapons, even 
given his voluntary admission that there may be a knife or knives in the vehicle, did not 
give officers reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner was presently armed and dangerous. 
The reasonableness of a frisk depends on "the totality of the circumstances." 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 1Hfl4, 25 (citations omitted). The totality of the circumstances in 
this case did not create a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner was "' armed and 
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presently dangerous to the officers or others.'" Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^ [13 (citation 
omitted). Although the deputies were alerted that the driver had a history of carrying 
concealed weapons, was mentally unstable and a drug user, this did not create a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner was armed or presently dangerous. The driver 
volunteered to the deputy that there was a knife or knives in the vehicle and even though 
the knife had not been located, nothing in Mr. Gardner's demeanor made the deputies 
fear for their safety. The driver's information showed that he, not Mr. Gardner had a 
knife and that knife was in the vehicle, not on a person. Further, even if the 
circumstances of the stop created a reasonable suspicion, Barrett mitigated the danger by 
ordering Mr. Gardner out of the vehicle while Day was covering him. When Mr. Gardner 
exited the vehicle, it dispelled any reasonable suspicion of danger, therefore, this Court 
should hold the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. 
In Baker, 2008 UT App 115, this Court held that the presence of multiple knives 
voluntarily given up to an officer by passengers inside the vehicle did not "tip the scales 
in favor of an objectively reasonable concern for officer safety," justifying the frisk of 
defendant after the occupants were removed from the vehicle. Id at fl9. Baker was a 
passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over because the license plate was not illuminated. 
Id at {^2. When the officer approached the vehicle, he "noticed a knife in a leather sheath 
on the thigh of a passenger in the back seat." Id, at p . Upon learning the driver had a 
suspended license for drugs, the officer requested a K-9 unit. Id By the time several 
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officers responded to the backup request, the driver had already been arrested. Id. at |^4. 
Another officer went to speak to the passenger who had been seen with a knife on his 
thigh. Id at ]|5. After the passenger "volunteered that he had a knife sitting on his 
thigh," the officer seized it. Id, Asking the passengers if there were any more knives in 
the vehicle, the passengers gave the officer "approximately twelve other knives, 
including a set of throwing knives." Id The officers testified that the passengers never 
"did anything to make him fear for his safety once the knives were confiscated." Id 
The passengers remained in the vehicle while a police dog sniffed around the 
vehicle and indicated the presence of drugs. Id at |^6. Baker was then frisked and a glass 
pipe was found in his pants and shoe, and ultimately methamphetamine. Id Denying 
Baker's motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that Baker was not unlawfully detained 
and given "the lateness of the hour, the number of passengers, the number of knives,... 
the ongoing arrest of the driver,.... [and] the K-9 unit's detection of drugs . . . 'it could 
not be much more clear that the officers reasonably believed that [Baker] and the other 
passengers were armed and dangerous.'" Id at f7. This Court disagreed holding Baker 
was illegally detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because while the officer 
had seen a knife in the possession of a passenger, it was not Baker and "nothing in the 
officers' testimony indicates any particularized suspicion involving criminal activity on 
the part of the passengers." Id, at ]fl3. Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances 
were insufficient to support the frisk. 
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Nothing other than the knives gave police officers any reason to take 
precautionary steps. Even the most potentially threatening aspect of the 
stop—the many knives—demonstrates the lack of an objective danger. 
According to [the officer's] testimony, the knives were volunteered to him 
while the passengers were waiting to be on their way. 
Idat1fl8. 
Similarly, the driver in this case had been pulled over for failing to properly signal 
and having a cracked windshield. R. 186:5; 187:63. The driver, not Mr. Gardner, had a 
hazard alert warning that he carried concealed weapons, was mentally unstable and a 
drug user. R. 187:67; See White, 856 P.2d at 661 (stating that a defendant's "previous 
arrest for criminal conduct may be relevant to a suspicion that [the same defendant] might 
be presently dangerous, depending on the nature of the charge, but is not determinative"). 
Before being arrested on an outstanding warrant, the driver volunteered to Day that there 
may be a knife or knives in the vehicle. R. 186:6, 8-9; 187:68, 87-88, 117. Although the 
deputy could not locate the knife, Mr. Gardner's movements while in the vehicle had 
been monitored continuously since the stop was initiated. R. 187:65, 85-86, 99. Day 
testified that Mr. Gardner appeared nervous but he stated that he did not witness him 
make any furtive movements. R. 187:65, 85-86, 99. 
Once Barrett arrived on the scene, he positioned himself on the passenger side of 
the vehicle where he could observe both the driver and Mr. Gardner. R. 187:116. And 
while Barrett testified that Mr. Gardner was nervous and was "fidgeting" with his hands 
and "shuffling" them "underneath his legs and then bringing them out and making a lot of 
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movements," by the time Barrett became aware that there might be a knife in the vehicle, 
he was already continually observing all of Mr. Gardner movements. R. 187:118, 142; 
See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 1989) ("[Movements, turning to the 
left and to the right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to look at the 
officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had 
occurred or was about to occur."); Parke, 2009 UT App 50, at %l 1 ("[M]ere furtive 
gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion 
suggesting criminal activity" and that "[a] search based on . . . common gestures and 
movements is a mere 'hunch,' not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth 
Amendment") (citation omitted). 
Other than exhibiting nervous behavior which "increased when [he was told] the 
driver was being arrested," there was nothing about Mr. Gardner's conduct that made the 
officers believe he was "being disruptive or aggressive or threatening in any manner." R. 
187:118; 186:19; See State v. Lafond 2003 UT App 101,120. 68 P.3d 1043 (expressing 
"reluctan[ce] to assign any particular importance to nervous conduct when determining 
reasonable suspicion in the context of a Terry frisk for weapons . . . when the 
nervousness is unaccompanied by any hostile, threatening, or aggressive behavior"). 
Finally, while Day "covered" Barrett, Barrett told Mr. Gardner to exit the vehicle 
because the vehicle was going to be impounded. Mr. Gardner willingly complied with 
the order. Barrett then asked Mr. Gardner "if he had any weapons or knives on him" and 
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Mr. Gardner stated that he did not have any weapons on him. R. 186:14; 187:70. 
Therefore, once Mr. Gardner had exited the vehicle, the inherent dangerousness of the 
stop was mitigated and there was no further reason to detain him. See Warren, 2003 UT 
36, ffl|26-27 (inherent dangerousness of traffic stops "is directly tied to a person's 
occupancy of, and potential access to, the vehicle" therefore "[i]t stands to reason . . . that 
if a person is ordered out of a vehicle, some or all of the inherent dangerousness of a 
traffic stop may be mitigated"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) 
("[Establishing a face-to-face confrontation diminishes the possibility, otherwise 
substantial, that the [occupant] can make unobserved movement; this, in turn, reduces the 
likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an assault."). The frisk was unnecessary 
because "[circumstances allowed the officers time to reassess the allegations of criminal 
activity and their initial suspicions of danger without being subjected to 'unnecessary 
risks in the performance of their duties.'" White, 856 P.2d at 666 (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 23). 
The totality of the circumstances stated above do not support a reasonable belief 
that Mr. Gardner was armed and presently dangerous to the deputies or others. Given 
that the officers (1) had no information that Mr. Gardner had a history with concealed 
weapons or violence; (2) were continually observing the movements of his hands; (3) 
testified that Mr. Gardner did not exhibit any aggressive or threatening behavior; (4) 
testified that Mr. Gardner stated he did not have any property in the car or any weapon on 
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his person; (5) testified that Mr. Gardner complied with officer's commands to exit the 
vehicle; and (6) testified that Barrett was "covered" by Day while Mr. Gardner exited the 
vehicle, the circumstances weigh against the reasonableness of the frisk. R. 187:70; 
Warren, 2003 UT 36 at f 32 (weighing factors to determine reasonableness of Terry 
frisk). Most telling of the officer's lack of a reasonable belief that Mr. Gardner was 
armed or presented a danger to them was the fact that Barrett sought Mr. Gardner's 
permission before conducting the frisk. R. 186:14; 187:70, 119. 
In sum, a frisk "'is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person' and should 
not be taken lightly." Warren, 2003 UT 36 at 1fl3 (citation omitted); see White, 856 P.2d 
at 665 (holding that "authority to permit a protective frisk for weapons 'must be narrowly 
drawn'" (citation omitted)); Lafond, 2003 UT App 101 at |18 (same). It must not be 
based on an officer's "'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch."'" Warren, 
2003 UT 36 at f 14 (citation omitted). Rather, it must be based on "'specific reasonable 
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
As demonstrated above, Barrett's frisk was not based on reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Gardner was armed and presently dangerous. Absent Mr. Gardner's increased 
nervousness upon learning the driver was being arrested, the only other factors relied on 
by the deputy to justify the frisk was the driver's hazard alert, the information 
volunteered by the driver that there may be a knife or knives in the vehicle and the 
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inability of the deputy to locate any knife at that moment. The totality of the 
circumstances show that once Mr. Gardner was outside the vehicle, the deputies could 
continue to safely observe Mr. Gardner. Instead, even though the deputy had monitored 
Mr. Gardner's movements while he was inside the vehicle and Mr. Gardner complied 
with all of Barrett's orders, Barrett requested to frisk Mr. Gardner and did so despite Mr. 
Gardner's lack of consent. Thus, this Court should hold that the frisk was not supported 
by a reasonable suspicion and violated the Fourth Amendment. 
B. The Totality of Circumstance Show the Fourth Amendment Was Violated 
Where Mr. Gardner Did Not Specifically and Unequivocally Consent to 
the Frisk. 
Whether or not a valid consent is given is based upon the totality of the 
circumstances. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ]|56, 63 P.3d 650. When looking at 
the totality of the circumstances "a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the 
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant." State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, 
1J14, 197 P.3d 99 (cert, granted); Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at |56. Consent is valid only if it 
was given voluntarily and "not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f72. It is the State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the consent was valid. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49; Hansen, 2002 UT 125 
at 1J56; State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990); State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 
388, ]fl4, 197 P.3d 99 (cert, granted). "This burden cannot be discharged by showing no 
more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49; 
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Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) ("[T]he State has the burden of proving that 
the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden 
that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority."). 
The trial court found that Barrett "asked to frisk the defendant and the defendant 
raised his arms and turned around." R. 50. The trial court concluded that "[b]y raising 
both arms and turning around, the defendant gave sufficient indication of consent to 
search." R. 50. The trial court's conclusion was incorrect. The totality of the 
circumstances show that given the show of police authority which included four 
uniformed officers, two police dogs and Deputy Day, presumably armed, ucover[ing]" 
Barrett while Mr. Gardener exited the vehicle, Mr. Gardner's actions reflect that he 
merely acquiesced rather than specifically and unequivocally consented to Barrett's 
request to frisk him. R. 187:70. 
To be valid, "[t]he totality of the circumstances must show consent was given 
without duress or coercion." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f57. This Court will "'look to see 
if there is clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely 
given.'" Tripp, 2008 UT App 388 at T[14; see also United States v. Butler. 966 F.2d 559, 
562 (10th Cir. 1992) (for evidence to be admissible where consent was given, "(1) [t]here 
must be a clear and positive testimony that consent was unequivocal and specific and 
freely given; and (2) [t]he government must prove consent was given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied"). "[M]ere acquiescence to an assertion of police authority 
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generally does not amount to voluntary consent so as to justify the search and seizure in 
question." 148 A.L.R. Fed 271, §2(a). Some of the factors looked at to determine 
whether or not consent was given under duress or coercion include the "claim of 
authority to search by officers;" "an exhibition offeree by the officers;" "a mere request 
to search;" and "deception or trick on the part of the officer." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 
[^57 (citation omitted). 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Gardner raising his hands and turning 
around while failing to verbally consent reflect that he was merely acquiescing to the 
show of police authority rather than specifically and unequivocally consenting to 
Barrett's request to frisk him. 
A distinction is recognized . . . between submission to the apparent 
authority of an officer and unqualified consent. Mere acquiescence in a 
search is not necessarily a waiver of a valid search warrant. Rather, for [a 
defendant] to waive his rights, it must clearly appear that he voluntarily 
permitted or expressly invited or agreed to the search. 
Ingram v. State, 364 So.2d 821, 822 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). "In the case of nonverbal 
conduct, where dueling inferences so easily arise from a single ambiguous gesture, the 
defendant's intention to surrender this valuable constitutional right should be 
unmistakably clear." People v. Anthony, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1193 (111. 2001). 
In Anthony, two officers were on a routine foot patrol when they noticed the 
defendant "turn away" from the officers after he had exited an apartment. Id. at 1190. 
One of the officers called out to the defendant to ask if they could talk to him. Id The 
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defendant stopped and the officers approached. Id The officers testified that the 
defendant "was nervous; his hands were shaking, and his voice was stuttering." Id. One 
officer became concerned because the defendant "repeatedly reached his hands into his 
pants pockets and pulled them out." Id. The officer asked the defendant to keep his 
hands where he could see them while they spoke, defendant complied. Id The officer 
then asked "'if [the defendant] had anything he shouldn't have, anything like guns, drugs, 
knives, anything that could hurt [him] or [his] partner.' The defendant answered "no."'" 
Id. The officer then asked the defendant if he would consent to being searched. Id The 
defendant did not answer but "[h]e spread his legs apart and put his hands on top of his 
head." Id The officer assumed the defendant was giving consent to be searched. Id 
The court acknowledged that while a defendant may "convey consent to search by 
nonverbal conduct,. . . 'mere acquiescence to apparent authority is not necessarily 
consent.'" Id at 1193 (citations omitted). The court noted that the officer never 
threatened the defendant, drew his weapon or applied any physical force. Id However, 
despite the defendant's compliance with the officer's command to keep his hands out of 
his pockets, the officer continued to question him about weapons and drugs. Id. When 
the defendant replied his did not possess anything that could hurt the officers, the officer 
still asked for consent to search him. Id Although the State argued for the court to infer 
the defendant's actions meant he consented, the court determined "[a]n equally valid 
inference from the defendant's ambiguous gesture is that he submitted and surrendered to 
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what he viewed as the intimidating presence of an armed and uniformed police officer 
who had just asked a series of subtly and increasingly accusatory questions." Id; see also 
State v. Woods, 486 S.E.2d 637, 638 (Ga. 1997) ('"silence in the face of a request for 
permission to search may, when accompanied by other conduct, sometimes be interpreted 
as acquiescence, [but] such acquiescence cannot substitute for free consent."). 
The totality of the circumstances show Barrett ordered Mr. Gardner to exit the 
vehicle after telling him that the driver was being arrested and the vehicle impounded; 
four uniformed officers were present at the scene and two police dogs; Officer Day, 
presumably armed, "covered" Barrett while Mr. Gardener exited the vehicle; after Mr. 
Gardner exited the vehicle, Barrett asked him if he had any weapons or knives, and Mr. 
Gardner said he did not; Barrett requested to frisk Mr. Gardner and Mr. Gardner without 
speaking "raised his arms up and turned around;" Barrett then performed a Terry frisk. 
Despite Mr. Gardner's failure to verbally consent, Barrett assumed Mr. Gardner's actions 
meant he was "submitting to a Terry frisk." R. 186:15. However, "[a]n equally valid 
inference from the defendant's ambiguous gesture is that he submitted and surrendered to 
what he viewed as the intimidating presence of an armed and uniformed police officer 
who had just asked a series of subtly and increasingly accusatory questions." Anthony, 
761N.E.2datll93. 
In this case, Barrett's testimony that Mr. Gardner's raised his hands and turned 
around in response to his request to perform a frisk is not "clear and positive testimony 
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that consent was unequivocal and specific and freely given." Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, 
]fl4. Thus, this Court should hold the frisk violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Furthermore, because the purpose of the stop had been effectuated, by the arrest and 
impounding of the driver and his vehicle, Mr. Gardener's continued detention violated 
the Fourth Amendment. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f31 ("Any further temporary detention 
for investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion of a further illegality.") (quotation and citation omitted); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 
687-88 (State's burden to prove voluntary consent after police illegality is much heavier 
"'than when proving consent to search' which does not follow police misconduct");but 
see Tripp, 2008 UT App 388 at ]fl5 ("'voluntariness is primarily a factual question, and 
the analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same without regard to whether the 
consent was obtained after illegal police conduct.'"). 
As argued in Part A above, once Mr. Gardner was removed from the vehicle the 
inherent dangerousness of the stop was mitigated and there was no further reason to 
detain him since the purpose of the stop had been effectuated. See Part A, infra. Yet, 
upon exiting the vehicle, Mr. Gardner was faced with the presence of four uniformed 
officers, one of which was "covering" Barrett, presumably meaning he was armed, and 
two police dogs. This show of police authority together with Barrett's questioning 
regarding whether Mr. Gardner had any knives or weapons on him followed immediately 
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by a request to frisk would not convey to a reasonable person that they are free to leave. 
See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ |39 ("If a reasonable person would not believe he or she is 
free to leave or disregard questioning, . . . the encounter remains an investigatory 
detention."); See Caralyn Miller Ross, Annotation, When Is Consent Voluntarily Given so 
as to Justify Search Conducted on Basis of that Consent, 148 A.L.R. Fed 271, §2(a) 
("Under certain circumstances, police conduct may amount to a sufficient show of 
authority that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, thus preventing the 
defendant's consent from being considered voluntary."). Thus, even if this court were to 
determine Mr. Gardner consent was voluntary, it was obtained by the deputies' 
exploitation of the unlawful detention. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at f73 (holding voluntary 
consent invalid where it was "obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality"). 
This court can review Mr. Gardner's unlawful detention argument under the plain 
error doctrine. To establish plain error it must be shown that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, 
or phrased differently, [the Court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). "When a traffic stop occurs, 'the driver of 
the car seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.... [and] a passenger is 
seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop." State v. Harding, 
2010 UT App 8, Tf6. It is well established that "[o]nce a traffic stop is made, the 
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detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.'" Lafond, 2003 UT App 101 at 1f 13 (citation omitted). "Once the 
purpose of the initial stop is concluded . . . the person must be allowed to depart." 
Harding, 2010 UT App 8 at *fl. However, the scope of the stop is still limited, ueven if 
'reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise.'" LaFond, 2003 UT 
App 101 at TJ14. This means that "officers must diligently [pursue] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which 
time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant." Id. (quotation omitted). 
In this case, it was error for the trial court not to have determined that Mr. 
Gardner's continued detention once he exited the vehicle violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Once Barrett had ordered Mr. Gardner to exit the vehicle, any reasonable 
suspicion, that Mr. Gardner would have access to the knife alleged to be in the vehicle, 
would have been dispelled and any continued detention violated the Fourth Amendment. 
See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at ^ [27 ("[I]f a person is ordered out of a vehicle, some or all of 
the inherent dangerousness of a traffic stop may be mitigated."). Not only did Mr. 
Gardner's removal from the vehicle mitigate the likelihood he would have access to the 
alleged knife but given that Barrett was also being "covered" by Day diminished any 
possibility that Mr. Gardner would make any unobserved movements in order to gain 
access to the knife. R. 187:70; Id ("'[establishing a face-to-face confrontation 
diminishes the possibility, otherwise substantial, that the driver can make unobserved 
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movements; this, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an 
assault.'") (quoting Minims, 434 U.S. at 110). 
Given that the only behavior attributable to Mr. Gardner was his nervousness and 
his "hand shuffling" which was continually monitored, nothing under these 
circumstances would have given the deputy reasonable suspicion that Mr. Gardner was 
armed and presently dangerous to them or others. R. 187:70, 142; See LaFond, 2003 UT 
App 101 at j^20 (affording nervous behavior "'no weight in determining a detaining 
officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity'"). This is especially true where Mr. 
Gardner's nervousness was "unaccompanied by any hostile, threatening, or aggressive 
behavior." Id (noting "it is not difficult to understand why [being ordered out of a car 
during a stop] would make a person nervous"). Established Fourth Amendment case law 
should have made the error of Mr. Gardner's continued detention obvious. See supra. 
Finally, the error was prejudicial because a finding that Mr. Gardner was unlawfully 
detained would impact on the trial court's conclusion of whether or not there was a valid 
consent to frisk, despite its conclusion that Mr. Gardner's non-verbal actions of raising 
his hands and turning around was a "sufficient indication of consent to search." See 
Hansen,2002UT125att61. 
C. This Court Should Suppress AH of the Evidence Found Because Its 
Discovery Was a Direct Result of the Illegal Frisk. 
"Under the exclusionary rule, 'evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
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search and seizure.'" State v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, fl 1, 65 P.3d 314 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). "The exclusionary rule 'also 
prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence . . . that is the product of... or that is 
otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search.'" Id (quoting Murray v. 
United States. 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988)); see also Warren, 2003 UT 36 at T[13 ("'If a 
protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is 
no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.'" (quoting Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993))); State v. McGrath. 928 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996) ("To deter violations of Fourth Amendment rights,. . . illegally-acquired 
evidence is inadmissible." (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914))). 
To determine whether evidence should be suppressed, courts "focus on whether 
the evidence resulted primarily from the '"exploitation of [the] illegality'" or '"by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.'"" McGrath, 928 P.2d at 
1036 (alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 
(1963) (citation omitted)). 
In this case, this Court should suppress all of the evidence against Mr. Gardner 
because its discovery was a direct result of the illegal frisk. Barrett found a glass drug 
pipe when he frisked Mr. Gardner's body. As argued above, the frisk violated the Fourth 
Amendment. See supra at Part A and B. Therefore, the glass drug pipe should be 
suppressed. See Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37 at ]fl 1. After placing Mr. Gardner under 
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arrest, methamphetamine in baggies, empty small green bags, prescription narcotics, 
cash, papers containing names and account information, along with some miscellaneous 
items were recovered. Because the discovery of these items was a direct result of the 
illegal frisk, they also should be suppressed. See Warren, 2003 UT 36 at T[13; McGrath, 
928 P.2d at 1036; Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37 at ^ [11. 
POINT II. TESTIMONY REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE, MONEY, "TALLY SHEET" AND OTHER EVIDENCE 
RECOVERED BEING INDICATIVE OF AN INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IS 
SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE ADMISSIBLE ONLY AS EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
"[I]f testimony, 'opinion or otherwise/ is based on 'scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge,"' it falls within the scope of expert testimony and "may not be 
admitted as lay fact [or opinion] testimony." State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, TJ20, 
147 P.3d 1176. "Whether testimony is classified as expert testimony under [the rules of 
evidence] is significant in that the party offering such testimony must satisfy various 
qualification and advance disclosure requirements." Id at ]|9. Admitting expert 
testimony when a party has failed to meet the qualification and advance disclosure 
requirements is an abuse of discretion. See State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ^|23, 
131 P.3d 292 (trial court abused discretion in failing to grant continuance after admitting 
expert testimony it previously ruled would not be admitted); State v. Bredehoft 966 P.2d 
282 (Utah 1998) (trial court abused discretion in admitting expert testimony where State 
failed to satisfy expert witness notification statute). 
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Where the State relies on the witnesses' specialized knowledge to prove an 
element of the offense, it cannot be said that the testimony did not influence the jury's 
verdict; therefore, the admission of the testimony denies the defendant a fair trial. See 
Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45 at ]f23 (remanding for a new trial where admittance of 
expert testimony "precluded [Defendant] from formulating a trial strategy best calculated 
to address the totality of the State's case"); cf State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,1J45, 24 P.3d 
948 (an abuse of discretion will be found where the trial court's denial of a mistrial "is 
plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot 
be said to have had a fair trial"). 
In this case, the deputies testified the quantity of methamphetamine recovered 
from Mr. Gardner together with other evidence was indicative of an intent to distribute. 
Mr. Gardner made a motion in limine to exclude the deputies' testimony arguing that it 
was inadmissible because it was based on specialized knowledge and the State had failed 
to meet the qualification and notice requirements for expert testimony. The trial court 
denied Mr. Gardner's motion agreeing with the State's argument that the deputies 
testimony was not expert testimony because it was "just based on their training and 
experience." 
During trial, after the trial court continued to overrule Mr. Gardner's numerous 
objections to the deputies' testimony that the evidence recovered was indicative of 
distribution, Mr. Gardner moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion 
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determining a curative instruction, asking the jury to disregard a statement by one deputy 
that the large bag of methamphetamine recover was for distribution, would be sufficient 
to overcome any prejudice. Where the State relied on these witnesses' specialized 
knowledge to prove Mr. Gardner had an intent to distribute, it was an abuse of discretion 
to rule the testimony was not expert testimony requiring the State to qualify and give 
advanced notice under Utah law. The trial court abused its discretion further by failing to 
grant the motion for mistrial. The trial court's errors require a new trial. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It 
states: 
[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added). Specialized knowledge is "knowledge 'with which 
lay persons are not familiar'" or "knowledge [that] is not within the ken of the average 
bystander." State v. Rothlisberger, 2004 UT App 226, ffl[31, 34, 95 P.3d 1193 (affirmed). 
Before such specialized knowledge or expert testimony can be admitted, it must satisfy 
"various qualification and advance disclosure requirements." Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 
at [^9. "Rule 702 has a built-in requirement that an expert witness be 'qualified.'" Id at 
TJ26. Expert witnesses are qualified "based on the totality of their qualifications and 
experience," which can include not only formal educational training, but also personal 
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and vocational experiences. State v. Kellev, 2000 UT 41, ^15, 1 P.3d 546; Rothlisberger, 
2004UTApp226at1J24. 
Notice is also an integral part of the admissibility of expert testimony. Both Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (a)(3) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13, govern the applicable 
notice requirements of expert testimony. Section 77-17-13 specifically applies to expert 
witnesses in felony criminal trials. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2008). When 
intending to call an expert, this section requires "notice to the opposing party as soon as 
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (l)(a). 
"Such notice must include the expert's name, address, curriculum vitae, and either the 
expert's written report, a written explanation of the proposed testimony, or notice that the 
expert is available for consultation upon reasonable notice." Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT 
App 45 at t i l . 
The expert witness notice requirement "contemplates that a party be able to 
adequately prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." State v. Tolano, 2001 UT App 37, 
f 8, 19 P.3d 400 ("[I]t is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare for all potential, 
yet undisclosed expert witnesses . . . ."). This more extensive notice gives a defendant 
time to examine the resumes, methods and qualifications, among other things, of the 
proposed expert and if necessary offer a challenge to them and incorporate the 
information into a defense strategy. Id at ]fl2. "All of these rules illustrate the policy 
judgment that expert testimony should be treated differently than lay testimony." 
34 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 at ^26. "If testimony based on specialized knowledge could 
be admitted [as fact or lay testimony] litigants could effectively avoid all of these 
requirements." Id. at [^27. 
The supreme court has held that an officer's "testimony as to the quantity of 
methamphetamine typifying personal use is expert testimony [based on his specialized 
knowledge] . . . subject to . . . qualification and advance disclosure requirements." Id at 
11. In Rothlisberger, Officer Eberling and Chief Adair testified at trial about "the 
significance of the quantity of drugs found in the car" in which the defendant was a 
passenger. Id. at ]|5. A small baggy of what appeared to be methamphetamine, "a larger 
baggy containing thirty-two grams of methamphetamine, a gym bag containing a scale 
and small baggies," and a "snort tube" used for storing and ingesting methamphetamine 
was discovered in a search of the vehicle. Id. at tTf2-3. 
Chief Adair testified regarding the quantities of methamphetamine usually 
packaged for personal use and that it is uncommon for those with personal quantities to 
have scales. Id at 1J30. The defendant, who was being tried for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, objected to the admission of Chief Adair's 
testimony because the State failed to give the advance notice required for expert 
testimony. Id at ^5. In arguing the Chiefs testimony was not expert testimony, and -
therefore not governed by the advance notice requirements, the State first contended that 
the testimony was admissible without regard to [Utah R. Evid.] 701 or 702 because it 
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"consisted only of statements of fact about his experiences." Id at ^ f 14. Rejecting the 
State's argument, the court determined that "both fact and opinion testimony based on 
specialized knowledge [is] within the scope of rule 702" and cannot be admitted as lay 
fact testimony. Id. at ]|20. 
Next, the State argued "that even if Chief Adair's testimony is based on 
specialized knowledge, his testimony was admissible under rule 701 because it was based 
on his personal perception and was helpful to the jury." Id at 21. The court noted that if 
the State's argument were permitted it would subsume Article VII of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence governing opinion and expert testimony. Id. at f22. "If testimony based on 
specialized knowledge could be admitted through rule 701 . . . litigants could effectively 
avoid all of [the qualification and notice] requirements by offering the testimony as lay 
testimony or by structuring their questioning to elicit only factual responses." Id at ]|27. 
Thus, "a distinction between rules 701 and 702" must be maintained meaning expert 
testimony based on specialized knowledge "may not be admitted as lay opinion testimony 
under rule 701. Id at f 23. The court concluded that "testimony based on specialized 
knowledge, whether in the form of fact or opinion, may be admitted only as expert 
testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id at [^29. 
Finally, the supreme court rejected the State's argument that Chief Adair's 
testimony that "individual's typically purchase '[a] quarter or half grams [sic][,] . . . " for 
personal use and do not usually possess scales was not specialized knowledge. Id at f 30. 
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The court concluded that the Chief gave expert testimony because it was based on his 
"specialized knowledge" as that term has been defined by its own case law and that of 
other courts. Id at ^31-34; (noting specialized knowledge has been defined as 
"knowledge 'with which lay persons are not familiar"). The supreme court found its 
definition of specialized knowledge consistent with the terms treatment in United States 
v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997) and United States v. McDonald, 933 
F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991), two cases it found persuasive. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 at 
1TI32-32. 
In Figueroa-Lopez, the court held that officers' testimony that the defendant's 
conduct was consistent with those experienced in drug trafficking was based on 
"specialized knowledge." 125 F.3d at 1244. The officers testified that Lopez's conduct 
consisted of "engaging in counter-surveillance driving," using terms that "were code 
words for a drug deal, a common practice of narcotics dealers," use of a rental car, "the 
large quantity and high purity of the cocaine indicated that Lopez was close to the source 
of the cocaine," and the way Lopez hid the cocaine "was consistent with the practices of 
experienced drug traffickers." Id "[T]he bulk of the above opinion testimony is properly 
characterized as testimony based on the perceptions, education, training, and experience 
of the witness." Id at 1246. "[I]n fact, several times, the Government instructed the 
witness to answer questions "based upon their training and experience." Id 
The officers' testimony "is precisely the type of "specialized knowledge" 
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governed by Rule 702." Id To hold otherwise "would encourage the Government to 
offer all kinds of specialized opinions without pausing first properly to establish the 
required qualifications of their witnesses." IdL As in cases where expert testimony has 
properly been admitted, in this case the testimony was needed to educate jurors about the 
"techniques employed by drug dealers in their illegal trade" to which ordinary jurors are 
probably unaware. Id at 1245 (citing United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 229-30 
(9th Cir. 1997) (allowing expert testimony that a sophisticated drug dealer would not 
entrust large quantities of cocaine to an unknowing dupe); United States v. Espinosa, 827 
F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing expert testimony regarding the use of 
apartments as "stash pads" for drugs and money); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 
1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing expert testimony on how criminal narcotics 
conspiracies operate); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1981) (per 
curiam) (permitting expert testimony that defendant's actions were consistent with the 
modus operandi of person transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance)). 
In McDonald, the court held that testimony regarding the amount of illegal drugs 
along with other evidence of drug trafficking is specialized knowledge. 933 F.2d at 
1522. McDonald was charged with possession with an intent to distribute. Id at 1520. 
An expert was called by the prosecution to testify about the significance of the quantity 
of cocaine, single-edge razor blade, telephone beeper, large amount of cash, food stamps, 
and loaded weapon all found in the defendant vehicle. Id The expert testified how all 
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the evidence found related to the drug trade and specifically tied it to those involved with 
dealing drugs. Id at 1521. The court found this to be proper expert testimony because 
"the evidence was specialized" and "[t]he jury could not be expected to understand this 
evidence without specialized knowledge." Id at 1522-23 (citing United States v. 
Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir. 1987) (expert testimony allowed concerning 
unique language of narcotics dealers); Unites States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 
501-01 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 947 (1990) (allowing expert testimony 
concerning large amount of cocaine and way it was concealed to be admitted on issue of 
defendant's intent to distribute)). 
The Tenth Circuit has also held that "the habits of drug dealers-including the 
amounts and combinations of drugs, methods of distribution, and the use of firearms—are 
not within the expertise of a lay person" but involved specialized knowledge where 
expert testimony "would assist in informing the average jury." United States v. Hartman, 
2006 WL 2567800, *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006) (unpublished Order) (attached in 
Addendum D). Similarly, the United States District Court of Utah has held that officers' 
testimony concerning "'techniques, modes, and methods by which drug traffickers 
conduct business,. . ., the distribution of drugs on a credit system ('fronting'), the process 
of 'cutting' drugs to increase profit margins, methods of packaging drugs for sale or 
transport, distribution versus user quantities of controlled substances, the valuation of 
controlled substances, and the identification of equipment, tools, and paraphernalia 
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common to [the] use and sale of controlled substances" involved specialized knowledge. 
United States v. Martinez, 2006 WL 2924957, *1 (D. Utah Oct. 10, 2006) (attached as 
Addendum E). 
In this case, Mr. Gardner made a motion and limine to prevent Barrett and Day 
from testifying that the quantity of methamphetamine recover from Mr. Gardner, together 
with cash, empty baggies, an alleged "tally sheet" and other evidence was indicative of an 
intent to distribute. R. 187:12-14; see Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d at 1244 (holding 
officers' testimony that defendant's conduct was consistent with drug trafficking 
including defendant's "engaging in counter-surveillance driving," using code words, use 
of a rental car and the quantity and quality of cocaine, was specialized knowledge); 
McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1522 (expert testimony about how the quantity of cocaine, single-
edge razor blade, beeper, large amount of cash, food stamps and loaded weapon related to 
the drug trade and tied defendant to dealing drugs was specialized knowledge). Mr. 
Gardner argued that because this testimony is based on specialized knowledge it is expert 
testimony subject to qualification and advance notice disclosure. R. 187:12-14. The 
State argued the officers' testimony was not expert testimony because "they would be 
testifying . . . just based on their training and experience." R. 187:12-13; see 
Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49 at ]f20 (rejecting State's argument that testimony based on an 
officer's experience is not specialized knowledge). The State contended that 
Rothlisberger did not apply because the officers would not be testifying about the weight 
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of the drugs but "about [the] many circumstances put together" that was indicative of an 
intent to distribute. R. 187:13. The trial court agreed that the officers' testimony was not 
expert testimony and denied Mr. Gardner's motion in limine. R. 187:13. 
During trial, Deputy Day testified that he had "experience dealing with drug 
recognition" and distribution methods. R. 187:62, 75. Day testified that the evidence 
recovered from the driver and Mr. Gardner indicated that there was drug distribution 
going on. R. 187:75. As Day began to testify that he based his decision to charge Mr. 
Gardner with intent to distribute in part on "[t]he large quantity of methamphetamine . . . " 
recovered, Mr. Gardner objected based on inadmissible expert testimony. R. 187:75. 
The trial court overruled stating that "I haven't heard an answer. And I don't know what 
the large quantity is. We'll see what it is." R. 187:75. The State then asked Day if there 
"[w]as anything in the scenario with Mr. Neubauer and Mr. Gardner in their car that 
indicated to you that there was drug distribution going on?" R. 187:75. According to 
Day, those indicators were the "money," "multiple quantities of baggies . . . with 
narcotics in them, a large portion of the same narcotic . . . that generally would be broken 
up into smaller baggies . . . [a]nd also what we call tally sheets, which are generally, like 
names . . . . " R. 187:76. Mr. Gardner renewed his objection arguing Day's testimony is 
based on specialized knowledge. R. 187:76. The trial court overruled the objection. 
Day then testified that he had one of the K-9 units on scene "perform a sniff on the 
money that Mr. Gardner had [to] see if the dog would indicate that there was any sort of 
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narcotic residue on that money." R. 187:77. Day hid the money inside the vehicle. R. 
187:77-78. The police dog "indicated on the money" hidden inside the vehicle. R. 
187:77-78. Day also testified that the smaller baggies of methamphetamine found on 
Mr. Gardner indicated to him "[t]hat it's being broken down for smaller sale." R. 187:80. 
The trial court overruled Mr. Gardner renewed objection based on inadmissible expert 
testimony. R. 187:81. 
On re-direct, Day testified that in his experience with methods of drug distribution 
it is "very common" to see two people working together to distribute drugs. R. 187:101. 
He testified that he did not "know the reasons why, but, generally . . . the passenger holds 
the drugs and does the dealing while the driver drives them to meet spots." R. 187:101. 
The trial court again overruled Mr. Gardner's objection based on inadmissible expert 
testimony. R. 187:101. Day finished his testimony by stating the situation with the 
driver and Mr. Gardner fit within this drug distribution scenario. R. 187:101. 
Similarly, Deputy Barrett testified that he received training in drug recognition and 
distribution methods. R. 187:115. Barrett performed the search of Mr. Gardner 
recovering from his right front coin pocket a glass pipe with white residue and a small 
green one inch-by-one inch bag with methamphetamine inside. R. 187:122,137. From 
his bigger right front pocket, Barrett recovered a sandwich bag with three empty small 
green one inch-by-one-inch bags, ten Seroquel 200 tablets in clear cellophane, and 
another small green on inch-by-one inch bag containing an equal amount of 
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methamphetamine were recovered. R. 187:123-24. Mr. Gardner also gave Barrett a clear 
plastic bag containing white crystals. R. 187:127-28,138. Barrett found $666 cash in 
Mr. Gardner's right back pocket. R. 187:128. In the left back pocket another sandwich 
bag containing papers with names, personal information, banking information and 
account numbers were recovered along with gift cards, a cellular phone battery, an iPod 
and miscellaneous papers. R. 187:128, 130. A pink paper contained personal names and 
bank information as well as business names and information. R. 187:133. Barrett first 
testified that in his training and experience the paper containing personal information and 
account numbers indicated elements of identity theft, a crime Mr. Gardner had not been 
charged with committing. R. 187:131. After the prosecutor asked if it was also 
consistent with drug distribution, Barrett testified: 
Many people who use drugs are not currently employed, have a hard time 
financing the drug problem. One of the common ways, I've discovered in 
my career for people to finance their own drug problem is to counterfeit 
checks and/or enter someone's account information to gain funds to pay for 
those drugs. 
R. 187:131. The trial court again denied Mr. Gardner's renewed objection based on 
inadmissible expert testimony. R. 187:131-32. After identifying the items Barrett 
recovered in the search, the prosecutor asked "based on your training and experience in 
drug interdiction, what does that packaging look like to you." R. 187:138. Barrett 
responded, 
The small packages are common either for personal use of drugs or for 
selling and distributing drugs, giving someone a small amount of your 
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drugs.. . . The larger package, in my experience, would be too large to 
actually sell, and that's a lot of methamphetamine to use for yourself. That 
looks like something you'd break down later into smaller packaging. 
R. 187:138. Mr. Gardner objected based on inadmissible expert testimony. R. 187:139. 
The trial court overruled the objection. R. 187:139. Mr. Gardner asked to approach and 
the court denied the request. R. 187:139. Mr. Gardner then moved for a mistrial. R. 
187:139. The trial court instructed the State to continue. R. 187:139. Barrett continued 
to testify that based on this training and experience, the small green empty bags are used 
most of the time "to hold illegal narcotics." Barrett testified that based on all his 
observations it indicated drug distribution was taking place. R. 187:140. The trial court 
again overruled Mr. Gardner's objection based on inadmissible expert testimony. R. 
187:40. 
After these two deputies had completed their testimony and the jury left the 
courtroom, the trial court addressed Mr. Gardner's numerous objections to their 
testimony as being inadmissible expert testimony and the motion for mistrial. R. 
187:160. The trial court stated that this case was different from the Rothlisberger case 
because "we're not talking about grams or amounts," instead the deputies testified about 
what the evidence indicated from their "training and experience" which the judge 
determined was not "specialized knowledge." R. 187:160-61. The judge continued 
stating: 
When [the deputies] come in and they say these little teener bags hold their 
rings or they hold personal use in my experience, they're not saying that 
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that's a—the weight or the grams or whatever. And they see a big package 
and they say, "Well, yeah, that's—in my experience, that big package is 
more than you need, and this is what we do for two—for an individual." 
He's not talking in scientific language they require under Rothlisberger. 
Now, I realize you're getting close when you talk about this big bag versus 
. . . these little bags. I admit, that's a -that's closer—but it's not scientific.. 
. . It's based on experience. 
[U]p until this big bag, you know, I don't -I'm not troubled by any of the 
evidence. And that's as close as it comes. . . . And that is you look at 
what's in the little bags and then you look at the big bag and the officer can 
testify based on his experience. 
R. 187:160-61, 163-64; see also R. 187:162 (defense counsel clarifying that argument is 
concerning "specialized" knowledge). After again reviewing Rothlisberger, the trial 
judge stated that the Supreme Court's "conclusion on what specialized knowledge is and 
isn ' t . . . doesn't make sense to me." R. 187:169. The trial judge was "still of the opinion 
that [he was] right" but "in an abundance of caution" proposed a curative instruction 
asking the jury to disregard just the portion of Barrett's testimony that 'there's a large 
amount of cocaine [sic]." R. 187:169, 181. The trial court told the jury it was up to them 
to "determine whether or not the State is proving a distribution case. But [Barrett's] 
opinion on that—on that issue is not relevant and I'll ask you to disregard that. . . . As to 
the rest of it, you can look at it for whatever." R. 188:181. 
Mr. Gardner renewed his motion for mistrial arguing that the testimony should not 
have come in, it was a key piece of evidence that the jury had now heard, and the 
testimony was too prejudicial to cure with an instruction. R. 187:173-75. The court 
stated, "Well, then you—you should have objected—just objected to it before the answer 
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came. When you heard the question. Because the answer was out prior to the objection. 
And so what I'm doing now is what I would have—had I originally sustained it, I would 
have said, Sustained. You're to disregard it." R. 187:175. The trial court's reasoning for 
denying the motion for mistrial is inconsistent with its ruling during the testimony of the 
deputies where Mr. Gardner objected before this type of testimony was offered, and the 
judge overruled the objection stating, "I haven't heard an answer. And I don't know 
what the large quantity is. We'll see what it is." R. 187:75. 
This is a case where the trial court initially denied the defense's motion in limine 
to keep out the deputies' testimony as inadmissible expert testimony because it was not 
about the weight of the drugs. R. 187:74-75. During trial when Mr. Gardner objected 
before Day could testify that his decision to charge Mr. Gardner with intent to distribute 
was based in part on the large quantity of methamphetamine recovered, the trial court 
overruled because it had not "heard an answer." R. 187:75. Mr. Gardner objected again 
when Day's testified that it was the "money. . . baggies, multiple quantities of baggies . . 
.with narcotics in them, a large portion of the same narcotic . . . that generally would be 
broken up into smaller baggies . . . and also what we call tally sheets . . ." that indicated 
an intent to distribute. R. 187:75-76. The trial court inquired what Mr. Gardner 
"claim[ed] [to be] specialized knowledge." R. 187:76. Mr. Gardner argued all of the 
testimony that this evidence equals an intent to distribute was specialized. R. 187:76. 
The trial court overruled the objection allowing Day to continue to testify. 
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Mr. Gardner continued to renew his objection throughout the rest of Day's 
testimony and again throughout Barrett's testimony. R. 187:80-81 (objecting to Day's 
testimony that the smaller packages of methamphetamine indicated "[t]hat it's being 
broken down for smaller sale"); R. 187:101 (trial court overruling objection to Day's 
testimony that it was common in his "experience with methods of drug distribution" to 
see two people working together to distribute drug); R. 187:131-32 (overruling objection 
to Barrett testifying "Many people who use drugs are not currently employed, have a hard 
time financing the drug problem. One of the common ways, I've discovered in my career 
for people to finance their own drug problem is to counterfeit checks and/or enter 
someone's account information to gain funds to pay for those drugs"); R. 187:138-39 
(overruling objection to Barrett testifying that "based on [his] training and experience 
with drug interdiction," the "small packages are common either for personal use of drugs 
or for selling and distributing drugs, [and] [t]he large package, in my experience, would 
be too large to actually sell, and that's a lot of methamphetamine to use for yourself. 
That looks like something you'd break down later into smaller packages"). 
When Barrett began testifying that the small packages recovered were common for 
either personal use or for distributing and the large package looked like something that 
had to be broken down into smaller packages because it was too large to actually sell and 
too large for personal use, Mr. Gardner again objected. R. 187:139. After the trial court 
overruled the objection, Mr. Gardner asked to approach. R. 187:139. The trial court 
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denied Mr. Gardner's request and Mr. Gardner moved for a mistrial. R. 187:139. 
Without ruling, the trial court instructed the State to proceed. R. 187:139. Barrett 
continue to testify that in his "training and experience, most the time, [the small baggies 
recovered are] used to hold illegal narcotic." R. 187:140. The prosecutor then asked 
Barrett whether the small baggies he found "indicate to [him] that distribution was going 
on?" R. 187:140. Barrett responded, "[b]ased upon everything that I saw that day and 
have here, yes." R. 187:140. The trial court again overruled Mr. Gardner's objection. R. 
187:140. 
By the time the trial court had addressed the motion for mistrial and proposed a 
curative instruction addressing a single statement in Barrett's testimony, both deputies 
had already completed their testimony detailing why in their "training and experience" 
the evidence recovered showed an intent to distribute. Even if the court were to entertain 
by some stretch of the imagination that the jury could disregard a single statement made 
by Barrett, the bulk of the deputies' testimony centered around how in "their training and 
experience" the evidence showed an intent to distribute. Moreover, the jury was allowed 
to consider this prejudicial statement as the trial court initially overruled Mr. Gardner's 
objection and did not address the motion for mistrial, instead allowing Barrett to continue 
with his testimony. The prejudice resulting from the testimony of two deputies who 
according to their own testimony were trained and experienced in drug distribution 
cannot be cured by an admonition to the jury. See Bredehoft 966 P.2d at 294 (harmless 
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error occurs "if the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high that it 
undermines [the Court's] confidence in the verdict"). This is especially true since Day 
had also given substantially similar testimony stating that the "money," "multiple 
quantities of baggies . . . with narcotics in them, a large portion of the same narcotic . . . 
that generally would be broken up into smaller baggies . . .[a]nd also what we call tally 
sheets, which are generally, like names" were indicators of distribution. R. 187:76. 
Given that the central issue in the State's case was whether the evidence recovered 
showed that Mr. Gardner had an intent to distribute, it cannot be said that the guilty 
verdict was unattributable to the error. See Tolano, 2001 UT App 37 at ^ [14 ("to establish 
that the prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that 
there is no reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecution's error, the outcome would 
have been more favorable for defendant."). Without the specialized knowledge of these 
experts, "the jury could not be expected to understand this evidence" to conclude Mr. 
Gardner had an intent to distribute. Furthermore, admission of the deputies' specialized 
knowledge "precluded [Mr. Gardner] from formulating a trial strategy best calculated to 
address the totality of the State's case." Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45 at Tf23. 
Therefore, admission of the expert testimony was not harmless and this Court should 
grant Mr. Gardner a new trial. 
Finally, the trial court's denial of Mr. Gardner's motion for mistrial was "plainly 
wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said 
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to have had a fair trial." Wach, 2001 UT 35 at Tf45. ^Because the trial court's decision 
was an abuse of discretion, this court should reverse and grant Mr. Gardner a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Gardner respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and remand for a new trial. In 
the alternative, a new trial should be granted where the State relied on the deputies' 
specialized knowledge to prove an element of the offense charged without meeting the 
qualification and advanced notification requirements for expert testimony. Admission of 
the deputies' testimony was prejudicial. Finally, this Court should grant Mr. Gardner a 
new trial where the denial of his motion for mistrial denied him of a fair trial. 
SUBMITTED this 1 5 day of March, 2010. 
/ s / 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I, DEBRA M. NELSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells 
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALEX PRESTON NIMER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 081401932 FS 
Judge: TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
Date: January 28, 2009 
PRESENT 
Clerk: mindyg 
Prosecutor: HILL, JOSEPH S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney{s): CHESNUT, HEATHER J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 2, 1988 
Audio 
Tape Number: 9007 Tape Count: 903 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 12/16/2008 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for 
this charge is 353 day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 6 day is) previously served. 
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Case No: 081401932 
Date: Jan 28, 2009 
SENTENCE FINE 




Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $2075.00 
Total Surcharge: $208.78 
Total Principal Due: $425 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by 05/28/2010. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $300-00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
Sc Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month (s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 12 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 425.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before May 28, 2010. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
No other violations. 
Comply with Adult Probation and Parole. 
Notify the court of any address change. 
Timely payments of all fines, attorney fees and restitution. 
Not to possess/consume alcohol or non prescribed controlled 
substance. 
Random urinalysis and drug testing as requested. 
Notify probation agent of any prescribed medication. 
P;arr<=a 9 
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Jan 28> 2009 
Not to associate with persons or frequent places where drugs or 
alcohol are being used or are the chief item of sale. 
Submit to search of self or property by probation agent. 
Receive drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with 
recommendations. 
Research paper on drugs. 
Maintain fulltime verifiable employment/education. 
Deft to complete a research paper on Heroin by 2-28-09 in lieu of 
days jail 
Deft may have credit towards the fine for costs of evaluation and 
treatment 
Bail maybe exonerated and returned to defts father 
Pay fines and fees to AP&P, agent to determine monthly payments Dated this jjtf day of 
TERRY CHaiSTO 
Distrter Court Judge'.- / 
r,Vw USED AT'DIRECTION'OF JUDGE 
•TiA**** 1 fl a a 1 - \ 
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LOHRA L.MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
AARON W. FLATER, 9458 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6020730 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Alex Preston Nimer, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 081401932 
The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
THE ABOVE-TITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court on December 3,2008, for 
hearing and judgment on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Honorable Terry L, 
Christiansen presided. The Defendant was represented by Heather Chesnut. Aaron W. Flater, 
Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County, represented the State. The Court notes that 
Officer Joshua Thomas of the Midvale City Police Department previously testified at a 
preliminary hearing on October 16,2008. The Court has reviewed a transcript of the Officer's 
testimony and finds the testimony to be credible and relies on that testimony for purposes of this 
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. Additionally, the court accepts State's proffer 
and the defendant's stipulation that Officer Thomas would testify that the syringes that the 
Defendant Alex Nimer had in his possession were identical in appearance to the syringe being 
used by the Co-Defendant, Bridget Renee Hood to inject heroin in her arm at the Sportman's 
0000S4 
ORIGINAL^ 
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Warehouse parking lot. Based upon the memoranda of law submitted and the arguments of 
counsel presented, and for good cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1, On August 1,2008 Officer Joshua Thomas of the Midvale City Police Department responded 
to the parking lot of Sportman's Warehouse located at approximately 165 West 7200 South in 
Salt Lake County. 
2, Officer Thomas was dispatched on a report of a suspicious circumstance which involved a 
female in the parking lot who was injecting heroin, 
3, When Officer Thomas arrived he saw a female that was in the process of injecting a substance 
that was identified as heroin. Officer Thomas arrested the female identified as Bridget Renee 
Hood. 
4, As Officer Thomas was dealing with Ms. Hood, an employee of Sportsman's Warehouse 
stated that the store had video surveillance of the incident and that prior to the officer's arrival 
two men had been with the female who was injecting drugs, 
5, The employee pointed out the two men who were at that time near the front entrance of 
Sportsman's Warehouse, 
6* Officer Thomas approached the two men and asked them if they had any weapons or anything 
that he should know about 
7. The Defendant, Alex Nimer, replied that he had some needles in his pocket including some 
open needles. 
8. Mr. Nimer removed the needles from his pocket and Officer Thomas could see that the 
syringes were identical in appearance to the syringe that was in the Ms. Hood's arm. 
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9. Officer Thomas also stated that in his experience the needles differed from those that he has 
seen diabetics possess. 
10. Officer Thomas stated that the needles in this case were by themselves and were not 
contained in any type of kit. 
1L It is Officer Thomas's experience that diabetics typically have their needles in kits and 
accompanied with insulin. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Officer's arrest decision is guided by a probable cause determination which is a 
much lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. It was reasonable for Officer Thomas to 
conclude that the needles possessed by Mr. Nimer were items of drug paraphernalia due to the 
facts that Mr. Nimer was identified as being with a Ms. Hood who was injecting heroin, the 
syringes he had were identical in appearance to the syringe she was using, and Mr. Nimer was 
close in proximity and time to Ms. Hood. Additionally the Court finds that Mr. Nimer's 
affirmative response to the Officer's question, "Do you have any weapons or anything we should 
know about?", reflects a consciousness of guilt and operates as an admission that Mr. Nimer's 
possession of the needles was not innocent. The Officer's decision to arrest Mr. Nimer was a 
reasonable decision in light of the Officer's experience and the totality of the circumstances and 
that decision was supported by probable cause to believe that Mr. Nimer was in possession of 
drug paraphernalia. 
<: 
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DATED this day of . 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
®QOOR>y 
/ » 
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LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
AARON W. FLATER, 9458 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6020730 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Alex Preston Nimer, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 081401932 
The Honorable Terry L. Christiansen 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is hereby ORDERED, that 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 081401932 FS 
Appellate Case No. Unknown 
vs. 
ALEX PRESTON NMER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO QUASH DECEMBER^, 2008 
BEFORE 
JUDGE TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
CT 
C_3 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
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inquiry about it, "Are you a diabetic? Do you have these for 
a medical purpose?'' Ask the employees questions. I mean it 
would have been required that he get just a little bit more 
to meet the probably cause standard. He just didn't do it, 
he just arrested, just on the basis of these needles. We 
would submit it. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court makes the 
following findings. On August 1, 2008 Officer Thomas 
received information from a Midvale Police Department 
dispatch that a female was shooting up heroin at the 
Sportsman's Warehouse. Upon arrival at the Sportsman's 
Warehouse, Officer Thomas observed a female shooting up 
heroin in the parking lot of the business, (3) that after 
arresting the female a Sportsman's Warehouse employee told 
Officer Thomas they had videotaped the female with two other 
males. The employee then pointed out the defendant and 
another male as being the two males spotted on the camera 
with the female. Officer Thomas then approached the 
defendant and the other male in the parking lot next to the 
Sportsman's Warehouse and when asked if there was anything he 
should be aware of or know about, he said he had some needles 
and that one of the needles was open. The officer had the 
defendant remove the needles from his pocket, place them on 
the ground. The needles that were placed on the ground were 
identical to the needle that the female individual was seen 
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1 I earlier shooting up heroin. 
2 I Officer Thomas then arrested the defendant for 
3 possession of drug paraphernalia and in a search incident to 
4 arrest found the defendant in possession of heroin. Those 
5 are the findings the Court makes to support the conclusions 
6 of law. 
7 Probable cause is not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
8 Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the 
9 officer and inferences can fairly be drawn therefrom are 
10 reasonable to a person, the officer's position would be 
11 justified in believing the suspect had committed the offense, 
12 In this particular case there is proximity in time 
13 and location between Mr. Nimer and the female co-defendant. 
14 Furthermore, there are identical needles. When the officer 
15 asked the defendant if he had anything he should know about, 
16 the defendant promptly stated that he had some needles and 
17 that one was open. I would think that his response is 
18 indicative of the fact that those needles were paraphernalia. 
19 I I think if an individual was possessing needles for an 
20 insulin injection, I don't know that they would respond that 
21 the officer needed to know about that but where you have a 
22 situation where a drug was being used by a companion of Mr. 
23 Nimer, certainly this Court believes that that is probable 
24 cause of criminal activity. 
25 Based on the foregoing, Ifm going to deny the 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Motion to Suppress. 
Mr. Flater, I'll have you prepare the findings of 
facts and conclusions of law. 
All right. We need to set this case for trial, 
disposition? What is your preference, Ms. Chesnut? 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, may we revisit this case 
in a few moments? I'll talk to Mr. Flater? 
THE COURT: Sure, we'll pass if for a moment. 
All right, next case? 
{Whereupon another case was handled) 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, if we could call Alex 
Nimer? 
THE COURT: You bet. 
MS. CHESNUT: Your Honor, we'd request (inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. Let's set a disposition date 
in two weeks. I can do it on either the 16th or 18th of 
December. 
MS. CHESNUT: Is the 16th a Tuesday? 
THE COURT: It is. 
MS. CHESNUT: I'm in trial on the 18th, so the "16th. 
THE COURT: All right, December 16 at 8:30. Thank 
you, 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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U. S. CONST, AMEND. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
UTAH CODE ANN, § 58~37a~3 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 58~37a-3. nDrug paraphernalia" defined 
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia1* means any equipment, product, or material 
used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, package, repackage, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled substance into 
the human body in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and 
includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or har-
vesting any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled 
substance can be derived; 
(2) kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, 
processing, or preparing a controlled substance; 
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any species 
of plant which is a controlled substance; 
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to analyze the strength, ef-
fectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance; 
(5) scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a controlled 
substance; 
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited, dextrose 
and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled substance; 
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds, or other 
impurities from marihuana; 
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or intended for use to 
compound a controlled substance; 
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use to package 
small quantities of a controlled substance; 
(10) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a controlled 
substance; 
(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to paren-
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terally inject a controlled substance into the human body; and 
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body, including but not limited to: 
(a) metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, 
permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls; 
(b) water pipes; 
(c) carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a marihuana 
cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand; 
(f) miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials; 
(g) chamber pipes; 
(h) carburetor pipes; 
(i) electric pipes; 
(j) air-driven pipes; 
(k) chillums: 
(I) bongs; and 
(m) ice pipes or chillers. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (2007) 
§ 58~37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is drug paraphernalia 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in addition to all 
other logically relevant factors, should consider: 
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use; 
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, under any 
state or federal law relating to a controlled substance; 
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this chapter; 
(4) The proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) The existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object; 
(6) Instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use; 
(7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use; 
(8) National and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) Whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate supplier of like or 
related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total sales of 
the business enterprise; 
(12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the community; and 
(13) Expert testimony concerning its use. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts-Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A-Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufac-
ture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or ar-
range to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any viola-
tion of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; 
and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in 
concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a posi-
tion of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management* 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or gam-
mahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third de-
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree 
felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if 
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the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or 
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in 
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for 
a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may addi-
tionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree fe-
lony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years 
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be sus-
pended, and the person is not eligible for probation, 
(2) Prohibited acts B-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional prac-
tice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tene-
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit 
them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing con-
trolled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felo-
ny; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third 
degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part 
of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
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(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a con-
viction under Subsection (l)(a)? that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2), 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (Hi), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, Upon a second conviction the 
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony; 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-
13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one 
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect 
to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetermi-
nate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year 
to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indetermi-
nate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
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(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another, 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty 
of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts O-Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(I) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, 
for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administra-
tion of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be 
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his re-
ceiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, sub-
terfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the 
use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or writ-
ten under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing de-
signed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying 
mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any 
drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled sub-
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stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felo-
ny. 
(4) Prohibited acts D-Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chap-
ter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Con-
trolled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the 
grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds 
which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a 
school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playh-
ouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds in-
cluded in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or dis-
tribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of 
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any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-31L3. 
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and 
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would oth-
erwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established w?ould have been 
less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(4X0 If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as pro-
vided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting 
with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly 
solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person 
to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistaken-
ly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was 
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the lo-
cation where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware 
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemea-
nor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (I)(b) and (2)(c)3 a plea of 
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has 
been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agree-
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rnent. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstand-
ing a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter. 
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu 
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a 
bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so 
with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or adminis-
tering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an as-
sistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his em-
ployment 
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as 
defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1 )(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian 
religion as defined in Subsection 58- 37~2(l)(w). 
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V)? it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative de-
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fense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior 
to trial 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good 
cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to 
the charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without 
the invalid provision or application. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (2008) 
§ 77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, 
arrest a person: 
(l)(a) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer; 
and 
(b) as used in this Subsection (1), "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A misde-
meanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested 
has committed it; 
(3) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person; or 
(4) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed the 
offense of failure to disclose identity under Section 76-8-301.5. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HEATHER J. CHESNUT #6934 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





ALEX PRESTON NIMER, 
Defendant, 
CaseNo.081401932FS 
Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH 
Appearance for the Defense: 
Appearance for the Prosecution: 
Judge: 
HEATHER J. CHESNUT 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
AARON W. FLATER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
District Attorney's Office 
111 South Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
STEPHEN L. ROTH 
State of Utah vs. Alex Preston Niraer 
CaseNo.#081401932FS 
Preliminary Hearing 
i n \C n o T.-J— r>-*» A f t r t n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Alright Ms. Chesnut 
Your Honor I'm ready on a preliminary hearing. I also have a 
matter to address with Ms. Fritz, but she hasn't been transported so 
we can do the preliminary hearing first. 
Alright. What preliminary hearing? 
Alex Nimer, N-l-M-E-R. 
Aaron Rater for the State. 
Alright. Mr. Nimer's here, the charges are unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, second degree felony; and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. Ms. Chesnut do you 
waive formal reading of the information? 
We do Your Honor. 
And is the State ready to proceed? 
Yes. 
Go ahead and call your first witness. 
Thank you Your Honor. The State calls Officer Thomas. 
And Your Honor I believe that there is only one witness, but if there 
are others, defense would ask the Court to invoke the exclusionary 
rule. 
Alright. Do you have any other witnesses here? 
No, just the one. 
Officer if you'll come up and be sworn? 
Swearing in of witness. 
' • * 
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1 W!T:1 Yes. 
2 Judge: Have a seat. 
3 ATP: Officer will you please state your full name and spell your last 
4 name? 
5 WIT: 1 Joshua Casey Thomas, T-H-O-M-A-S. 
6 ATP: And Officer Thomas how long have you been a police officer? 
7 WIT:1 Year and a half. 
8 ATP: And has all of that time been with Midvale City? 
9 WIT:1 Yes. 
10 ATP: Okay. Were you on duty on August 1st, 2008? 
11 WIT. 1 Yes. 
12 ATP: Uh what were you doing on that day? 
13 WIT: 1 Uh regular patrol. 
14 ATP: And uh were you called to...or did you go to a location of 
15 approximately 165 West 7200 South in Salt Lake County? 
16 WIT:1 Yes. 
17 ATP: And when you arrived at that location uh what did you see? 
18 WIT: 1 Uh I was called for suspicious circumstance. Um the call said a 
19 female was shooting up heroin and Sportsman's Warehouse had 
20 them on camera. 
21 ATP: And did you see uh a female when you got there? Did you see a 
22 female who appeared to be using drugs? 
State of Utah vs. Alex Preston Nimer Preliminary Hearing 
Case No. 081401932FS 10-16-08-.ludnA Rnth 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 















Yes. I got out of my vehicle and uh was hiding behind the vehicle, 
and I peeked around the corner and she was shooting up 
heroin... or what was later identified as heroin. 
Was she alone? 
At the time yes, and so I approached her and took her into custody. 
And then an employee from Sportsman's Warehouse came out and 
said that on camera they had that two other males were standing 
up...at the front of...outside of the front of the store, uh was with 
this female. 
And did you see the two men that were identified as being with this 
11 female? 
12 W1T:1 Yes. 
13 ATP: Did you go approach them? 
14 WIT:1 Yes. 
15 ATP: Now was uh Alex Nimer...Alex Preston Nimer one of those men? 
16 WIT:1 Yes. 
17 ATP: Uh do you see him here in the courtroom today? 
18 WIT:1 Yes. 
19 ATP: And would you point to him and describe what he's wearing 
20 please? 
21 WIT: 1 He's...white shirt and jacket. 
22 ATP: Where is he seated? 
23 WIT: 1 Right here. 
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1 ATP: Urn Your Honor would the Court note for the record that the officer 
2 has identified the Defendant? 
3 Judge: He's identified the Defendant. 
4 ATP: Thank you. Uh did you...did you speak with Mr. Nimer at that time? 
5 WIT: 1 Yes. We walked over to Mr. Nimer and another defendant and 
asked if they had anything in their pockets we should know about, 
Alex replied to me that he had some needles in his pockets. I then 
asked him if he had any needles that were open, he said yes, and 
so we asked him to take his, you know, take those needles out and 
put 'em on the ground, which he did. At that time we took him into 
custody and search incident to arrest, I found a sock full of.,.which 
was later positively Id'd as uh heroin and paraphernalia. 
And did you speak with uh Mr. Nimer about what the substance 
was? 
Yes. 
And what did...what did he say to you? 
I asked what these...uh what was in the balloons, and he...he 
proceeded to tell me that they were heroin. 
And what did you do with the heroin that you uh retrieved from Mr. 
Nimer? 
I booked it into our cri...into our evidence room. 
Okay. Your Honor may I approach the witness? 
You may. 
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1 ATP: Officer I've handed you what's been marked as uh State's exhibit 
2 number 1, Uh do you recognize that document as pertaining to this 
3 particular case? 
4 WIT:1 Yes. 
5 ATP: Uh does it have uh an agency case number listed on the top of that 
6 document? 
7 WIT:1 Yes. 
8 ATP: And does that match the uh your police agency case number uh 
9 from this incident? 
10 WIT:1 Yes. 
11 ATP: Does it also have the...the name of Mr. Alex Nimer on there as a 
12 suspect? 
13 WIT:1 Yes. 
14 ATP: If you uh will take a look at page two of that document Officer, 
15 there's uh two different items that are identified. Could...could you 
16 indicate on there which item urn correlates to the uh evidence that 
17 you retrieved from Mr. Nimer? 
18 WIT:1 The top one. 
19 ATP: Uh so are you indicating item 138519? 
20 W1T:1 Yes. 
21 ATP: And uh...and that is heroin was identified in the seven balloons? 
22 WIT.1 Uh-huh. 
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1 ATP: And how do you know that those were the...that was the item that 
2 you uh retrieved from Mr. Nimer? 
3 WIT: 1 I checked with our spillman report which I booked into our evidence 
4 room. I verified the number and the amount 
5 ATP: Your Honor the State moves to introduce uh State's exhibit number 
6 1 into evidence. Uh criminalistic uh analysis report for the heroin 
7 that was tested. 
8 Judge: Any objection? 
9 ATD: No objection Your Honor. 
10 Judge: It's received. 
11 ATP: And I may have asked you this already, if I did I apologize. 
12 Did...was this uh...did this take place in the City Limit...or the 
13 County Limits of Salt Lake County? 
14 WIT:1 Yes. 
15 ATP: And the location of the... of the place where you contacted Mr. 
16 Nimer uh was that in a... uh can you describe where that was uh? 
17 Is it a parking lot of Sportsman's Warehouse is that what you said? 
18 WIT: 1 Yes it was right next to the entrance doors to... it was on the North 
19 side of the uh Sportsman's Warehouse, next to the entrance doors 
20 in the parking lot on the curb. 
21 ATP: Okay. And is that a parking lot that's accessible to the public? 
22 WIT:1 Yes/ 
23 ATP: No further questions at this time Your Honor. 
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1 Judge: Thank you, Ms. Chesnut 
2 ATD: Officer did the call that you originally received of suspicious activity 
3 include any information about any males that were with the female? 
4 WIT:1 No. 
And you said when you first saw her that she was alone? 
Yes. 
What exactly was she doing? 
She was sitting on the curb, she had a rubber band around her 
arm, and she had a needle she was going like this sticken the 
needle inside of her. 
She was actually placing the needle inside her at the time? 
Yes. 
Now was she directly in front of Sportsman's Warehouse or to the 
side, or in back? 
She was on the side, which is the East side, in-between two parked 
cars. 
She was between two parked cars? 
Uh-huh, on the curb. 
Did you ever identify the vehicle that she arrived...where...that she 
20 arrived in? 
21 WIT:1 No. 
22 ATD: Now you said that a Sportsman's Warehouse employee said that 
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Yes. 
Did you only talk to one employee or more than one? 
Uh I talked to two employees. 
Were they security for Sportsman's or simply employees? 
Uh loss prevention, both of fem. 
Did you actually see this video? 
I... I saw the full video, but some of their video footage cut out. 
Did you see the video at that time or at a later date? 
Later date... later time, same day. 
When they told you the two males had been with this female did 
they tell you when they had been together, and where on the 
premises they had been together? 
Urn no, they just said there was...all three of 'em...they just said 
that two of the males were with the female at one time. 
And they didn't say how long before hand? 
No. I.. J didn't even know if they were...the males were still there, I 
just...they said...at the time after I put the female in 
cusody... custody... they said the two males are at the front of the 
building right now, and so... 
The employees told you that? 
yes, two employees did. And so we didn't even know if they 
were...if the two males were up there, we just happened to walk up 
there. The security followed us and they said that's them. 
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1 ATD: Kay. So the security accompanied you up to the front of the 
2 building and showed you that these were the two males? 
3 WIT: 1 Yes. 
4 ATD: Did you ever take the identification of these males? 
5 WIT:1 Yes. 
6 ATD: When was that? 
7 WIT: 1 At the time of the arrest. After they were taken into custody. 
8 ATD: Okay. Now when you first approached them you said that you 
9 asked them whether they had any weapons? 
10 WIT: 1 Weapons or anything I should know about, yes. 
11 ATD: Is that the only thing you asked them or did you ask them anything 
12 else? 
13 WIT:1 Nope, that was it 
14 ATD: Now there's another officer with you, is that correct? 
15 WIT:1 Yes. 
16 ATD: Did the other officer ask them anything? 
17 WIT: 1 Uh not to my knowledge. 
18 ATD: Now did Mr. Nimer immediately produce the needles? 
19 WIT:1 Yes, 
20 ATD: Would you describe those please? 
21 WIT: 1 Uh clear tube with a orange cap on the end. 
22 ATD: At that time did he tell you anything about the needles? 
23 WIT:1 No, 
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1 ATD: How many were there? 
2 WIT; 1 I can't be sure cause of all three, urn there were so many needles I 
3 I'm assuming there was at least five, but I did book them into 
4 evidence if I need to get the numbers of that 
5 ATD: Did the other male produce any objects? 
6 WIT:1 I don't recall. 
7 ATD: Okay. So it was immediately after producing these needles that 
8 you took him into...placed him under arrest? 
9 WIT:1 Yes. 
10 ATD: Now did you discover anything other than the needles prior to 
11 placing him under arrest? Maybe I'm not being clear, so he 
12 produced the needles? 
13 WIT:1 Yes. 
14 ATD: Did he produce anything else at all before you placed him under 
15 arrest? 
16 WIT: 1 Not that I remember. 
17 ATD: After you placed...did you place both of these males under arrest? 
18 WIT:1 Yes we did. 
19 ATD: Now I think I may not have heard this.. .this part of the testimony, 
20 but when you were searching him incident to arrest, what did... Mr. 
21 Nimer I should say, when you were searching Mr. Nimer incident to 
22 arrest, what exactly did you find and where was it? 
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1 WIT: 1 I found a black sock in...! don't remember if it was in his pants or in 
2 his...I don't remember if it was in his pants or in his leg...or in his 
3 pockets or in his leg is where I found it. I don't remember. 
4 ATD: Did you personally find it... 
5 WIT:1 Yes. 
6 ATD: or did the other officer? 
7 WiT:1 I did. 
8 ATD: Kay. You said that this bio...black sock contained balloons? 
9 WIT: 1 Yes. There were seven balloons uh I don't remember the drug 
10 paraphernalia, but I know there was. I can't recall what the exact 
11 paraphernalia was at this time. 
12 ATD: Okay. Besides the sock, was there any other...was there anything 
13 else located on Mr. Nirner? 
14 WIT: 1 Not that I can recall. 
15 ATD: I have no further questions. 
16 Judge: Re-direct? 
17 ATP: Officer have you been trained in the detection and the identification 
18 of narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia? 
19 WIT:1 No. 
20 ATP: Uh did you receive any...any training in the post uh... 
21 WIT:1 Yes. 
22 ATP: with regards to drug paraphernalia? And what... can you describe 
23 that training? 
11 
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1 WIT: 1 Urn it was a long time ago, I don't...L.I know there's...know that, 
2 you know, Midvale has trained us somewhat not urn having gone 
3 through like a.,,through a class or anything. But like anything with 
4 balloons urn any white powdery substance, or green leafy 
5 substance. Um usually if, you know, if I think it's some sort of drug 
6 I field test it 
7 ATP: Okay. And then with regards to drug paraphernalia as...your 
8 experience as an officer, how often do you come across uh drugs 
9 and drug paraphernalia? 
10 WIT: 1 Uh probably once a week. 
11 ATP: And you've been an officer for a year and a half? 
12 WIT: 1 Yes. And then uh Salt Lake County Protective Services for a year, 
13 so a total of 2 and a half years. 
14 ATP: Okay. Did you encounter uh drug paraphernalia as well in your 
15 previous experience... 
16 WIT:1 Yes. 
17 ATP: with probation? Uh so are...you're familiar with uh the use...how 
18 drugs are used and what equipment is to... 
19 WIT: 1 Somewhat 
20 ATD: to use them? Now you indicated that uh you arrested, or you made 
21 the decision to arrest Mr. Nimer after he pulled some needles out of 
22 his pocket. Can you explain why it is that uh you felt that there was 
12 
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1 significant that he'd pulled needles out of his pocket, what's...what 
2 were the needles? What did they appear to be? 
3 WIT: 1 Well because of what I had just found right around the corner, to uh 
4 loss prevention officer's told me these two were related to him...or 
5 to her in this matter. Urn and finding paraphernalia and urn seeing 
6 her shoot up heroin, which she admitted to me that um I...I 
7 assumed that these were also related to drugs. 
8 ATP: So you be.,.you believe then based on what you'd seen, um the 
9 woman shooting up drugs, and uh that these...and the knowledge 
10 that these two men were with her, that these were in fact needles 
11 that were used for...for drug use.? 
12 WIT:1 Yes. 
13 ATP: No further questions Your Honor. 
14 Judge: Kay anything further Ms. Chesnut? 
15 ATD: Just briefly Your Honor. 
16 Judge: Go ahead. 
17 ATD: Officer have you ever seen diabetic needles before? 
18 WIT:1 Yes. 
19 ATD: How did these needles differ in appearance from the diabetic 
20 needles that you have seen in the past? 
21 WIT: 1 Uh these were just needles by themselves, not without any kit, or 
22 anything like that. A kit for... 
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Do you mean that uh there wasn't insulin pulled out of the pocket 
along with the needles? 
Uh insulin or a black kit 
Kay. I have no further questions Your Honor. 
Okay, thank you. Thank you officer. 
Thank you. 
Does the State have any other witnesses? 
No Your Honor the State rests, 
9 Judge: Alright. Ms, Chesnut do you intend to present any evidence or call 
10 any witnesses? 
11 ATD: i don't Your Honor. I've advised Mr. Nimer of his right to testify at 
12 this hearing and advised him not to testify, I believe hell be taking 
13 that advice. 
Are you gonna take your attorney's advice? 
Yes. 
Alright. Anything further on this then? 
No. 
Okay. Pm uh... 
Your Honor I do have some argument... 
Go ahead, let's hear your argument. 
Your Honor LJ 'm going to object to the bindover on the basis of 
second degree felony, ask that it be boundover for a third degree 
felony. As I'm reading through the places that would enhance this 
14 
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1 to a second degree felony, I don't believe that's been shown here. 
2 The only one that possibly would apply is subsection 8, that the 
3 crime occurred in a parking.,.public parking lot or structure. I think 
4 that there are a couple of different problems with that. This was a 
5 private business and not a public parking lot. I think that the statute 
6 contemplates a public parking lot where it is not owned by a private 
7 entity, which this clearly was. In fact, I donl think it was even clear 
8 that they were actually in the parking lot when they were discovered 
9 in possession of these items. It appears that they were simply at 
10 the front of the store, and so I would object to it being boundover on 
11 the...as a second degree felony. Also I'd object to the bindover on 
12 drug paraphernalia, the only evidence of that were these needles 
13 and it's basically.. .there's basically nothing independent of the 
14 other defendant that was originally arrested, to show that these 
15 were drug paraphernalia. The officer did testify that he thinks that 
16 there was some paraphernalia found in the sock, but he can't even 
17 remember what that was and so that can't be the basis of a 
18 bindover on the paraphernalia. I think there is clearly enough to 
19 bindover on possession, but as a third degree felony. I don't think 
20 there's been enough presented on the paraphernalia or on the 
21 second degree felony. 
22 Judge: Right, Mr. Flater? 
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Thank you Your Honor. I uh just suggest that uh the evidence 
showed that this was a parking lot that was accessible to the public, 
used for uh public... public use, and that it was open at that time. If 
there is some I.. A my recollection of the evidence was that the 
officer testified that this was within a public parking lot. If the 
testimony is not clear on that I... I guess we'd ask for the Court's 
permission to re-open the case to explore exactly... 
Well I guess the question iVe got, and I had the same question 
which is, subparagraph seven says in a shopping mall, sports 
facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, play house or parking 
lot, or structure adjacent thereto. So they've talked about 
some...some private facilities that and there park...there 
associated parking lots. In this one it says a public parking lot or 
structure, and it seems to me that given what seven said that the 
arguments strong there that what they meant is a parking lot that's 
open to the public for whatever purpose. She's basically saying 
this was the Sportsman's Warehouse parking lot... 
Uh-huh. 
And uh you know on some level uh I would assume that that isn't 
open for any public purpose, that they... that they have restrictions 
on who parks there... 
Right 
to people who are using their facilities. 
16 
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I understand that argument and I guess uh I did not bring my code 
book with me, I'm...I'm curious uh... 
Let's.Jet'stakea look. Is there a... 
If there's a definition. 
definition? It's uh 58-37-8. You know it...there's not a uh public 
parking lot or parking lot definition in the definitions part of chapter 
37, and there doesn't appear to be anything further in uh paragraph 
8 or section 8 that uh explains it any further. So it sort of stands 
there, are you aware of any case law either of you? 
I'm...I'm not. Is there a definition of shopping...shopping mall? 
Lets see. No. 
Okay. 
Doesn't look like anything in there is uh is specifically defined. 
Let me... let me just make a motion then because I... I don't have 
any case law, I'm not aware of any case law, but I will...I will make 
a motion to uh join your motion to amend it to a third degree felony. 
Okay. Then I'll bind that over as a third degree felony. I am 
binding over the class B misdemeanor paraphernalia, given the 
proximity of the needles to the heroin on his person, even though 
they weren't in the same pocket. And uh the female shooting up in 
the parking lot who'd earlier been associated with them, I think 
there's sufficient uh.. .there's a sufficient association with the drugs 
uh to conclude for purposes of this preliminary hearing that the 
17 
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needles were paraphernalia. So I'm binding over on that as well. 
Do you want to enter pleas at this point? 
Uh yes Your Honor well enter not guilty pleas... 
Alright 
and we'd waive reading. 
Kay, not guilty pleas are entered and then the bindover is to Judge 
Christiansen, 
October 23 at 8:30? 
Your Honor Pm just curious to know whether a uh... is there any 
report from pretrial services in there as to regards to the 
Defendant's compliance with pretrial? 
No. Let's.,, let me take a look at the...did she...did Melissa provide 
a pretrial? 
The Defendant tells me he's out on bail and not on pretrial services. 
Is he on bail? 
Oh he's out on bail? 
You're not to pretrial? 
Okay (inaudible) thank you. 
Thanks. 
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